Introduction by Hasson, Adam I
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 5
12-1-1986
The New World Information and Communication
Order and International Human Rights Law
Stephen Raube-Wilson
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International and
Intercultural Communication Commons, International Law Commons, and the Library and
Information Science Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen Raube-Wilson, The New World Information and Communication Order and International
Human Rights Law, 9 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 107 (1986), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/
vol9/iss1/5
The New World Information and 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In December 1984, the United States withdrew from membership in the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).' 
One of the major reasons for the U.S. withdrawal was the perception held by 
U.S. officials that the UNESCO secretariat has supported the debate over the 
establishment of the New World Information and Communication Order 
(NWICO).2 The NWIC03 is a rather amorphous set of demands, originating 
principally from Third Worid nations,. aimed at correcting what those countries 
view as an imbalance in the international flow of information.s As of yet, the 
, u.s. Notifies UNESCO of Intent to Withdraw. 84 DEP'T STATE BULL. 41 (1984); UNESCO Farewell, 
TIME, Dec. 31,1984, at 14. UNESCO, one of the largest of the United Nations' independent agencies, 
serves as the educational and cultural arm of the United Nations. Massing, UNESCO Under Fire, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1984, at 89. The United Nations founded UNESCO in 1946 in order to 
help prevent the outbreak of war by promoting educational, scientific, and cultural exchanges among 
peoples. P. HAJNAL, GUIDE TO UNESCO 11-12 (1983). The preamble of UNESCO's constitution 
advances the proposition "[t]hat since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that 
the defenses of peace must be constructed." UNESCO CONST. preamble, reprinted in P. HAJNAL, supra, 
at 403. In recent years, UNESCO has sponsored a wide variety of programs, most of which are aimed 
at the development of Third World countries. Massing, supra, at 89. 
2 Massing, supra note I, at 94; Power & Abel, Third World vs. The Media, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21,1980, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 117. The NWICO was not expressly mentioned by the United States in its letter of 
withdrawal. See 84 DEP'T STATE BULL, supra note I, at 41. Nonetheless, it has been a source of U.S. 
criticism of UNESCO. Other charges by the United States against UNESCO include excessive politi-
cization and mismanagement. Massing, supra note I, at 90. In 1984, Great Britain also gave notice that 
it would withdraw from L'NESCO at the end of 1985. UNESCO Farewell, supra note I, at 14. 
3 This concept has also been variously referred to as the New International Information Order, New 
World Information Order, and New International Information and Communication Order. All of 
these names generally describe the same concept. 
4 The term "Third World" refers to the approximately 110 newly emergent countries of the world, 
primarily located in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. They are also referred to as "less-developed 
countries," "the Group of 77," "developing countries," "underdeveloped countries," and "the South." 
See generally Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law 
of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 555 (1979). Despite the over-generalization necessarily involved 
in the use of such terms, this Comment will also refer to the First World (United States, Canada, 
Europe, and Japan) as the North and the West, and to the Second World (the countries of the Soviet 
bloc) as the East. 
5 See generally Masmoudi, The New World Information Order, 29 J. COM. 172 (1979); Aggarwala, New 
International Information and Communication Order: Setting the Record Straight, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & 
COMPo L. 9 (1982). 
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NWICO is still a matter of debate within UNESCO and has not been expressly 
drafted as an official legal document.6 
Currently, there is no comprehensive international infon'nation order per se.' 
The present situation is best described as a laissez-faire system permitting an 
unfettered flow of information among countries. B The only restrictions on this 
flow are those enacted on the national level by individual states. The proponents 
of NWICO claim that this unregulated state of affairs in iriformation exchange 
has produced the following effects: a de facto imbalance in the flow of infor-
mation from North to South, inequitable distribution of communication re-
sources, insufficient and negative reportage of Third World news, a western 
cultural bias in news about the Third World, and transmission of messages from 
North to South that are irrelevant, or even harmful, to developing cultures.9 
Officials from the West, East, and South agree that a great imbalance in infor-
mation flow exists. IO 
The NWICO is essentially a plan, albeit one which has yet to be formulated 
in any detail, that proposes to remedy the existing inequality in the flow of 
information. Its scope is quite broad, encompassing the exchange of all types 
of information relating to political, social, and economic subjects. I I The NWICO 
also embraces all known means of exchanging such information, including the 
media, books, films, and data banks. 12 Thus far, UNESCO has cast the discussion 
of the NWICO primarily in terms of political, economic, and social policy 
questions. 13 In recent years, however, legal scholars have begun to discuss the 
international legal implications of the NWICO.14 The legal debate over the 
NWICO centers on the differences between the U.S. position that a free and 
unfettered flow of information is an established international legal principle, 
and the NWICO proponents' belief that a government balanced flow of infor-
mation is permitted b)l international law. IS 
The United States views the free flow of information as an individual human 
right which is protected from government control. 16 The proponents of the 
6 See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
7 Schiller, Freedom from the 'Free Flow,' 24 J. COM. 110, 110 (1974). 
"Id. 
9 Masmoudi, supra note 5, at 172-75. 
10 Power & Abel, supra note 2, at 116, 122; see also Massing, supra note I, at 94. 
JI Aggarwala, A Third World View, in CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS xv, 
xvi (Richstad & Anderson eds. 1981). 
12Id. 
13 See UNESCO, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD xvii (1980) [hereinafter cited as MacBride Report]. 
14 Theberge, UNESCO's "New World Information Order:" Colliding with First Amendment Values, 67 
A.B.A.]. 714, 718 (1981). 
15 Note, A New International Information Order: The Developing World and the Free Flow of Information 
Controversy, 8 SYR.]. INT'L L. & COM. 249, 249-51, 263 (1980). 
16Id. at 264. 
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NWICO also believe that there is a human right to information, but that this 
right may be limited by a national government in the interest of balancing the 
flow of information. I7 NWICO's proponents have asserted two legal bases for 
this restriction of the flow of information at the expense of the rights of the 
individual. 18 First, the proponents assert that, under the theory of national 
sovereignty, human rights are granted and defined domestically rather than 
internationally.19 Second, the proponents assert that, under the theory of cul-
tural protectionism, certain international standards allow for the balancing of 
information flow by governments.20 
This Comment will examine the basis of the human right to free flow of 
information in international law. Particular emphasis will be placed upon what 
the author perceives as a trend toward the internationalization of human rights 
law. Within this context of international human rights law, this Comment will 
discuss the differences between the theories of national sovereignty and cultural 
protectionism in providing a legal basis for the NWICO's government control 
of the flow of information. The author concludes that there is an international 
legal principle supporting the free flow of information, but that the establish-
ment of the NWICO need not totally surrender to the control of national 
governments the individual's right to freedom of information. 
II. UNESCO AND THE NWICO 
One proponent of the NWICO, articulating the Third World view, has rec-
ognized that a major element of the new order would be the promotion of 
"national communications policies, as being necessary to each country's eco-
nomic and social development and of a nature to motivate its citizens on behalf 
of such development."21 The United States claims that such policies would take 
the form of government censorship, and accordingly would restrict or stop the 
international flow of information. 22 U.S. opponents of the NWICO fear that 
action by UNESCO, in the form of resolutions supporting of the establishment 
of the NWICO, would legitimize governments' attempts to limit the interna-
tional flow of information.23 Under the current laissez-faire system, the inter-
national flow of information has been restricted, to some extent, on the national 
17Id. at 263. 
18 [d. 
19 See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
21 Masmoudi, supra note 5, at 178. 
22 Theberge, supra note 14, at 718. 
23 [d. Such resolutions, if adopted by UNESCO, would not be legally binding, but might further a 
tendency toward national censorship policies. Gross, International Law Aspects of the Freedom of Information 
and the Right to Communicate, in THE THIRD WORLD AND PRESS FREEDOM 55, 72 (P. Horton ed. 1978). 
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level by government actions.24 U.S. critics believe that the establishment of the 
NWICO would lead to an increase in national government restrictions, thus 
limiting the availability of information for all peoples.25 
UNESCO's constitution mandates its involvement with communications is-
sues.26 Before the 1960s, UNESCO's involvement in this area was primarily 
focused on promoting the exchange of information materials, such as books 
and newspapers. 27 UNESCO's initial pronouncement of the concept "new world 
information and communication order" was in its 1978 Mass Media Declara-
tion.28 At present, UNESCO's name has become synonymous with the call for 
the NWICO and, consequently, the opponents of the NWICO have severely 
criticized the organization.29 
The 1978 Mass Media Declaration recognized that the flow of information 
should be both free and better balanced, and that the media should playa role 
in the quest for peace, development, antiracialism, and the protection of cul-
ture. 30 Currently, about two-thirds of the world's population does not have 
access to modern communications.31 Also, four western news agencies gather 
and report over eighty percent of the news in the world. 32 As a result, news 
and other information about the Third World, disseminated internationally, 
originates from a Western perspective.33 This control over information is par-
24 Note. supra note 15. at 255. Restrictions in some countries have led to the imprisonment of foreign 
journalists. Id. at 255 n. 35. 
25 Theberge. supra note 14. at 718; Note. supra note 15. at 255-56. 
26 UNESCO CONST. art. I. para. 2(a). reprinted in P. HAJNAL. supra note I. at 404. 
27 P. HAJNAL. supra note I. at 243. 
28 Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to 
Strengthening Peace and International Understanding. to the Promotion of Human Rights and to 
Countering Racialism. Apartheid and Incitement to War. UNESCO Res. 4/9.3/2. 20 UNESCO Gen. 
Conf. Res .• UNESCO Doc. 20 C/Resolutions. 100. 102. Preamble (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mass 
Media Declaration]. See Nordenstreng. Behind the Semantics-A Strategic Design. 29 J. COM. 195. 196 
(1979). 
29 Massing. supra note I. at 94. 
30 Mass Media Declaration. supra note 28. at 102. 
31 Power & Abel. supra note 2. at 122. 
32Id. at 117. These agencies are the Associated Press. United Press International. Reuters. and 
Agence France-Presse. Id. Other examples of the one-sidedness of international information flow 
include the fact that. according to 1973 figures. Latin America. the Middle East. and Asia (excluding 
Japan and China) import about 50% of their television programs. while Western and Eastern Europe 
import 30% or less. de Sola Pool. Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of National Cultures. in 
CONTROL OF THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: VALUES IN CONFLICT 27. 33 (Aspen Institute Program 
on Communications and Society 1974). The United States. the U.S.S.R .• and Japan each import 5% 
or less. Id. In addition. according to information from the 1960s. of 39.483 translated titles of motion 
pictures and books. 15.279 were translated from English. 5368 from French. 3892 from German. and 
3822 from Russian. Figures of all other languages were much lower. Id. 
33 Power & Abel. supra note 2. at 117-18; Aggarwala. supra note 5. at 12. Two examples of this 
western orientation in news are a tendency to view Third World political events in East-West terms. 
and a tendency to report news of disasters rather than development. Aggarwala. What is Development 
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ticularly important in the modern era, because some commentators consider a 
country's power to be directly dependent upon its control over information.34 
Although the Mass Media Declaration was constructed in the vague language 
of compromise, it was the first official acknowledgment by the United Nations 
of the Third World's demands for a more just and equitable information order.35 
Following its initiative in the Mass Media Declaration, UNESCO next at-
tempted to layout a comprehensive scheme of the current problems in infor-
mation and communication, and to suggest possible avenues of solution, by 
forming the Commission for the Study of Communications Problems (known 
as the MacBride Commission).36 The report of the MacBride Commission,37 
however, failed to delineate a precise definition of the NWICO.38 The conclu-
sions and recommendations section of the MacBride report called for a variety 
of measures, including the economic and technical development of communi-
cation infrastructures in the Third World, the formation of national cultural 
policies, the use of communications in development and education, reform of 
tariff rates hindering communications flow, and increased protection of, free-
dom for, and responsibility from journalists.39 Generally, the United States 
supports the above recommendations of the MacBride Commission, which are 
essentially aimed at increasing the ability of the Third World to send messages.40 
Comments by representatives of the Third World, however, indicate that these 
measures will not be sufficient. 4l The Third World is still very interested in 
refining the concept of the NWICO, and in employing government controls on 
the flow of information in order to balance it. 42 
Since the MacBride Commission submitted its report to the twenty-first session 
of UNESCO's General Conference in 1980, UNESCO has taken no formal 
action to further define or implement the NWICO.43 The U.S. withdrawal from 
News?, DEVELOPMENT FORt:M, Oct. 1978, reprinted in 24 J. COM. at 180; see aLia M. ROSENBLUM, COUPS 
AND EARTHQUAKES 1-6 (1979). 
34 Power & Abel, supra note 2, at 117. 
35 Nordenstreng, supra note 28, at 196. The original draft of the 1978 Mass Media Declaration was 
proposed in UNESCO by the Soviet Union in 1972. P. HAJNAL, supra note I, at 244. For a background 
on the changes leading to eventual U.S. acceptance of the final version see Nordenstreng, supra note 
28, at 195-98; P. HAJNAL, supra note I, at 244-46. 
'6 P. HAJNAL, supra note I, at 247-48. 
37 MacBride Report, supra note 13. 
" Harley, Policy Analysis and Critique of the MacBride Commission Report 32 (interim working 
paper) (1980). 
"MacBride Report, supra note 13, at 253-72. 
40 Harley, supra note 38, at 25-29. 
41 MacBride Report, supra note 13, at 281 (remarks of Commissioners Marquez and Somavia). 
42 Masmoudi, The New World Information and Direct Broadcast Satellites, 8 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 322, 
329 (1981). 
43 See Massing, supra note I, at 96. The twenty-first session of the General Conference did not 
officially accept the MacBride Commission's recommendations, but did commend the MacBride Com-
mission for its valuable contribution to the study of communication. P. HAJNAL, supra note I, at 249-
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UNESCO, however, has changed the dichotomous nature of the political debate 
over the NWICO.44 Some U.S. officials believe that the U.S. withdrawal will 
make it easier for the proponents of the NWICO within UNESCO to promote 
their plans.45 With the likelihood of political change in the international infor-
mation and communication order on the horizon, the legal nature and param-
eters of the individual's right to information and the government's right to 
control the flow of information will be important factors in the shaping of the 
NWICO. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO A FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION 
A. Background 
In attempting to establish the individual's right to information as a principle 
of international law, two factors will be considered: first, whether international 
law articulates such a principle of freedom of information, and second, whether 
international law actually protects this individual right through an enforcement 
mechanism. 
As expressed by the Statute of the International Court of Justice, there are 
four sources indicating the existence of a principle of internationallaw.46 They 
are international agreements (conventional international law), international 
practice (customary international law), general principles of law of civilized 
nations, and judicial decisions and teachings of publicists of various nationsY 
Of these, international conventions and custom are the m~or sources of inter-
50. The twenty-first session did, however, approve the establishment of the International Programme 
for the Development of Communications (IDPC), whose purpose is to increase the communications 
abilities of developing countries. Id. at 255. 
44 Massing, supra note I, at 96. 
45 Should U.S. Withdraw from UNESCO?, 96 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 34 (1984) (interview with 
Samuel DePalma, member of the United States National Commission for UNESCO). The United 
States has had some success in combatting anti-freedom of information forces within UNESCO in the 
course of the debate over the NWICO. Id. It is believed, however, that the U.S. pullout will allow 
countries opposed to U.S. positions, such as the Soviet Union, to gain a consensus on restrictive 
measures. Id. 
At this time, the politics of the debate over the NWICO have become very complex. The East, while 
approving aspects of the NWICO concept which support greater government control over the media, 
has been generally against proposals for giving greater access to journalists. P. HAJNAL, supra note I, 
at 249. Despite general Soviet support for the NWICO, the Soviet member of the MacBride Commis-
sion has also expressed misgivings about the whole idea of a NWICO, comparing it with the aims of 
Nazi Germany. Id. at 248. Although Third World governments have been strong proponents of the 
NWICO, some groups in the Third World, particularly journalists, have been suspicious of the NWICO 
and its support of government control over information flow. [d. at 255. In the West, some developed 
countries, such as Canada, have supported the NWICO, sharing Third World concerns about cultural 
and economic protectionism. Id. 
46 STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ART. 38. 
47 [d. 
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nationallaw.48 When two or more states expressly consent to a principle through 
the making of a treaty or covenant, that principle becomes part of conventional 
internationallaw.49 Generally, such a principle of conventional international law 
is binding only upon the contracting parties.50 When an overwhelming majority 
of nations have tacitly consented to a practice, or usage, as a principle of law, 
this practice becomes a principle of customary internationallaw.51 Unlike con-
ventional international law, a principle of customary international law is then 
applicable to all nations. 52 General principles of law, on the other hand, are 
derived from the municipal law of various nations, which may supplement 
custom or treaty as a source of law. 53 Finally, decisions of jurists and teachings 
of publicists may serve as evidence of a particular principle of international 
law. 54 
Although most states adhere, to some degree, to the principle of free flow of 
information, domestic application of this principle varies widely. 55 Because state 
practice is so inconsistent, free flow of information does not constitute a prin-
ciple of customary internationallaw.56 Therefore, one must look to international 
conventions to determine the extent to which an individual's right to a free flow 
of information is protected by international law. Although several international 
documents refer to freedom of information,57 the most important of these for 
the purposes of this Comment are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights58 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 59 
In looking to the Universal Declaration and the Civil and Political Covenant 
for the establishment of the free flow of information as an international legal 
right, one must also examine the extent to which this individual right is pro-
tected by the international community from national government interference. 
48 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). 
49/d. at 27-28. 
50/d. at 28. 
"/d. at 17. 
52 /d. at 18. 
53 Id. at 29-30. 
54/d. at 31-33. 
55 Buergenthal, The Right to Receive Information Across National Boundaries. in CONTROL OF THE DIRECT 
BROADCAST SATELLITE: VALUES IN CONFLICT 73 (Aspen Institute Program on Communications and 
Society 1974). 
56 Gross. supra note 23. at 61. Customary law is established by state practice. not verbal adherence 
to a principle. Id. 
57 Buergenthal. supra note 55. at 74 (citing documents). Most of these documents are regional human 
rights agreements which thus do not attempt to establish global norms. /d. at 74. 
58 G.A. Res. 217. U.N. Doc. A/810. at 71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration]. 
59 G.A. Res. 2200. 21 U.N. G.A.O.R .• Supp. (No.16) 52. U.N. Doc. Al6316 at 52 (1966) [hereinafter 
cited as Civil and Political Covenant]. The adoption of the Civil and Political Covenant. along with 
that of the International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. infra note 171. completed 
the process of the creation of an international bill of rights. of which the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration was the first stage. Gross. supra note 23. at 61. 
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Since every right must have a remedy, these documents must permit the indi-
vidual to assert his enumerated rights against a national government.50 In order 
to discern whether the individual is granted an enforceable right to freedom of 
information by international law, one must consider the status of the individual 
in international law. Traditionally, only states were protected by or subject to 
international rights and duties. 51 Individuals were thought to be merely objects 
of international legal rules, which regulated only actions between states, not 
between states and individuals.52 The natural corollary of this doctrine is that 
individuals cannot assert rights before an international tribunal.53 This doctrine 
has been codified in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which 
does not recognize individuals as parties before it.54 As a result, under this 
traditional view, international rights could only be granted to individuals 
through local municipal laws, since only local tribunals could provide the rem-
edy.65 
Since World War II, however, individuals have gained some status as subjects 
of internationallaw.65 The U.N. Charter's recognition of fundamental human 
rights was the beginning of a change from the traditional theory of the individ-
ual in internationallaw.67 This change represents a departure from international 
law's historic deference to the sovereignty of states at the expense of individual's 
rights.68 For a document containing statements of human rights to be a truly 
international legal instrument, it must require that states refrain from certain 
conduct in respect for the individual's rights guaranteed in the document.59 In 
addition, states must give up some portion of their sovereignty by allowing 
individuals to enforce these rights against the state through the international 
community.70 To establish free flow of information as a legal principle, there-
fore, it will be necessary to show that it is enforceable through the international 
60 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 420-21 (1968). 
61 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 48, at 636-37; G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1976). 
62 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 48, at 639. 
63Id. at 637. 
64 STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ART. 34(1). 
65 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 48, at 637. 
66 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 60, at 61. 
67Id. 
68Id. at 70. 
69 !d. at 305. 
7°Id. The term enforcement, as used here, does not imply the use of force or other extreme means 
of compulsion. !d. at 292. It would include, however, investigation of complaints, supervision of 
compliance, and provision of remedies for violations. Id. Authorities hold conflicting opinions as to 
whether the enforcement mechanism must include a legally binding judgment. Compare id. (legally 
binding judgment necessary); with Mose and Opsahl, The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 271, 322-23 (1981) (legally binding judgment not 
necessary). 
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community. If this right to information has not become internationalized in this 
manner, then any state has absolute freedom to limit the individual's right for 
any reason. In the NWICO debate, the United States has asserted that free flow 
of information is an international legal right. 71 For this to be so, the right to 
free flow of information must not only be part of an international legal docu-
ment; it must be enforceable by the individual against the state. 
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Western writers have pointed to the Universal Declaration as the cornerstone 
of the individual's right to free flow of information in international law. 72 Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration states that "[ e ]veryone has the right ... to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers."73 Standing alone, this section provides for an individual right to 
receive and impart information. 74 
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration provides for some limitations on 
Article 19: 
[i]n the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.75 
The provisions of Article 29 do not, by themselves, render the Universal Dec-
laration useless as a legal document. 76 The fact that one's rights cannot be 
exercised to the point that they interfere with the rights of others or with the 
operation of the state does not contradict the notion of human rights. 77 The 
state, however, cannot have the last word on when these restrictions are justi-
fied. 78 Yet, under the Universal Declaration, the state has complete control over 
the granting and restricting of the rights provided. 
71 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
72 Gross, supra note 23, at 59; Theberge, supra note 14, at 718. 
73 Universal Declaration, supra note 58, art. 19. 
74 Gross, supra note 23, at 59. When the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration after 
World War II, a primary value of international relations was free enterprise. This economic principal 
of freedom from government interference was thus embodied in Article 19's statement on information 
flow. See Schiller, supra note 7, at III, Laskin, Legal Strategies for Advancing Information Flow, in CONTROL 
OF THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: VALVES IN CONFLICT 59, 59 (Aspen Institute Program on 
Communications and Society 1974); 
75 Universal Declaration, supra note 58, art. 29. 
76 See H. LAVTERPACHT, supra note 60, at 366. 
77/d. 
78/d. 
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When the member states of the United Nations adopted the Universal Dec-
laration, they were virtually unanimous in denying that the document was legally 
binding.79 The preamble of the Universal Declaration states that the document 
is to be a "common standard of achievement" securing rights through "universal 
and effective recognition and observance" by member states of the United 
Nations.so In other words, states parties to the Universal Declaration are not 
legally obligated to observe the right to free flow of information granted by 
Article 19. Also, there is no provision allowing individuals to assert a right to 
freedom of information under the Universal Declaration in an international 
forum.sl The Universal Declaration merely states that individuals have a right 
to freedom of information, but it does not create a duty on the part of the state 
to observe that right. Nor does it provide for an international enforcement 
mechanism. Thus, by itself, the Universal Declaration does nothing to protect 
the right to seek, receive, and impart information. The right to free flow of 
information exists only to the extent that it is granted or limited by the domestic 
law of sending and receiving nations.s2 Under the Universal Declaration, there-
fore, it is not a binding principle of international law. 
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Civil and Political Covenant in 1966 
as an attempt to formulate a binding international bill of rights.s3 With respect 
to the individual right to free flow of information, Article 19 of the Civil and 
Political Covenant contains language almost identical to that of Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration.s4 In addition, Article 19 of the Civil and Political Cove-
nant emphasizes the "special duties and responsibilities" that accompany the 
rights enunciated.s5 Article 19 allows for certain restrictions on these rights 
which are provided by law in order to respect the rights or reputations of 
79Id. at 397. Some authorities state that the Universal Declaration does impose legal obligations on 
states parties as an authoritative interpretation of the human rights guaranteed by the U.N. Charter 
(arts. 55, 56). Buergenthal, supra note 55, at 73-74. Others, however, disagree, since to say that the 
Universal Declaration is an authoritative interpretation of a legally binding document (the U.N. 
Charter) is to assert that the Universal Declaration itself is legally binding. H. LAUTERPACHT, sUfrra 
note 60, at 408-09. 
80 Universal Declaration, supra note 58, preamble. 
8, Gross, sufrra note 23, at 60. 
82Id. at 59. 
83 Id. at 61. 
84 Compare Universal Declaration, sufrra note 58, art. 19 with Civil and Political Covenant, sufrra note 
59, art. 19(2). Article 19(2) of the Civil and Political Covenant provides: "Everyone shall have the right 
to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, 
or through any other media of his choice." Civil and Political Covenant, sUfrra note 59, art. 19(2). 
85Id. art. 19(3). 
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others, or to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health, 
or morals.86 Furthermore, Article 20 of the Civil and Political Covenant calls 
for the prohibition of both propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial, 
or religious hatred.87 These allowances for state restrictions resemble Article 29 
of the Universal Declaration and, similarly, do not by themselves contradict the 
legal nature of the document. 88 
The major difference between the Universal Declaration and the Civil and 
Political Covenant regarding the establishment of the right to free flow of 
information as a legal principle is that the Civil and Political Covenant is a 
legally binding agreement among the states parties.89 The Universal Declaration 
asserts that its provisions are a "common standard of achievement,"90 whereas 
the states parties to the Civil and Political Covenant agree to "respect and to 
ensure to all individuals ... the rights recognized in the present Covenant."91 
Beyond legally binding the states parties, the Civil and Political Covenant, 
along with its Optional Protocol,92 provide an international implementation 
mechanism.93 The Civil and Political Covenant establishes a Human Rights 
Committee94 which is competent to observe state implementation measures,95 to 
consider charges of violation of the covenant brought by states parties,96 and to 
consider claims of violations brought by individuals against states parties.97 This 
provision for the assertion of international legal rights by individuals under the 
Civil and Political Covenant and the Optional Protocol represents an acknowl-
edgment of the improved status of the individual as a subject of international 
law.98 Under the Civil and Political Covenant, the individual has the ability to 
assert international rights against a state before an international body.99 
Despite this improvement in the legal status of the individual's right to seek, 
receive, and impart information, some limitations still remain. First, states par-
ties to the Civil and Political Covenant can make complaints to the Human 
86 Id. 
87 Id. art. 20. 
88 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
89 Gross, supra note 23, at 63. 
90 Universal Declaration, supra note 58, preamble. 
91 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 59, art. 2. 
92 The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 
21 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. N6316 at 59 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Optional 
Protocol]. 
93 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 59, Part IV. 
94 Id. art.28. 
95 Id. art. 40. 
96 Id. art. 41. 
97 Optional Protocol, supra note 92, art. I. 
98 Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L.SCH. L. REV. 11,25 
(1978). 
99 Id. at 24. 
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Rights Committee about violations of the document by another state party only 
if both nations have made an optional declaration under Article 41 of the Civil 
and Political Covenant. 100 Similarly, an individual can bring a complaint before 
the Human Rights Committee only if the offending country has adopted both 
the Civil and Political Covenant and the Optional ProtocoJ.!°1 Once a claim of 
violation of the Civil and Political Covenant has been properly brought before 
the Human Rights Committee, the committee will then act in a quasi-judicial 
role. l02 It will determine if there has been a violation and express its views on 
the matter to the parties and to the public through publication. 103 These views 
are not binding upon the state party, but may carry enough moral or public 
relations weight to induce compliance with the Civil and Political Covenant and 
the Optional Protocol. 104 
The Civil and Political Covenant raises another question in terms of the 
conflict between the right to seek, receive, and impart information and need 
for a balanced flow as proposed by the NWICO: whether or to what extent 
Article 19 confers rights on the media. lOS Some commentators assert that the 
laissez-faire concept of freedom of information has actually operated in a man-
ner adverse to the interests of individual rights by concentrating the control of 
100 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 59, art. 41. According to information provided by the 
Treaty Section of the United Nations, as of December 31, 1984, the following states had ratified or 
acceeded to the Civil and Political Covenant: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Columbia, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, italy, 
jamaica, japan, jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, 
Peru, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab RepUblic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukranian SSR, Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia. 
Of these states the following have made the optional declaration under Article 41 of the Civil and 
Political Covenant recognizing the competence of the Human Rights Committee: Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
101 Optional Protocol, supra note 92, art. I. The following states have ratified or acceeded to the 
Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant: Barbados, Bolivia, Canada, Central African 
Republic, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Iceland, 
italy, jamaica, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, 
Portugal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Suriname, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zaire. 
102 Mose and Opsahl, supra note 70, at 324. 
103Id. at 322. These views, in cases already decided by the committee, have included a statement of 
the obligations of the offending state party to ensure that the covenant is observed and to provide 
remedies. [d. at 324. 
104Id. at 322-23; see supra note 70. 
105 Gross, supra note 23, at 63. 
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information flow in the hands of a few media corporations. lo6 The U.S. per-
spective on this issue of free flow presupposes that the product of the com-
munications industry should be subject to the same rights as the ideas of the 
individual in the context of the rights granted by Article 19 of the Civil and 
Political Covenant. 107 The personal right guaranteed by Article 19 is generally 
interpreted as a property right of the media owners. lOB It is not clear that Article 
19 of the Civil and Political Covenant would favor a free flow of information 
that protects a corporation's economic interests as opposed to a government 
controlled flow aimed at protecting the citizen's right to compete in the seeking 
and imparting of information. 109 Regardless of whether one believes the inter-
ests of the media to be adverse to, or at least independent of, those of the 
individual, the proponents of the NWICO have phrased the debate in these 
terms. 110 
One further observation about the extent to which Article 19 of the Civil and 
Political Covenant establishes a principle of free flow of information concerns 
the allowance for possible state restrictions. III Some states have broad notions 
of what is necessary to protect national security, public order, public health, and 
morals in order to limit the human rights of their citizens. ll2 In the context of 
the freedom of information under the Civil and Political Covenant, these broad 
grants of state power would presumably be limited and defined through actions 
by the Human Rights Committee.ll3 Most promising, however, is the fact that 
the states' restrictions will be measured by the committee according to an inter-
national standard. 114 Under the Universal Declaration, states need not justify 
their restrictions upon the right to information; implementation is left com-
pletely in the states' hands. ll5 The Human Rights Committee, however, has the 
ability to reject national reasons for restricting information flow given under 
the rubric of the ordre public clause of Article 19. 
As a whole, the Civil and Political Covenant establishes the individual's right 
to information as an international legal principle. 116 It also establishes a legal 
basis for state control over this individual right to a free flow of information. ll7 
106 Schiller, supra note 7, at 111-12 (quoting President Urho Kekkonen of Finland). 
107/d. at 113. 
lOB [d. In an attack upon a UNESCO media declaration, an officer of the Columbia Broadcasting 
System (CBS), a U.S. television network, stated that the broadcaster's right to use the spectrum was 
protected by the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of free speech to individuals. [d. 
109 See Gross, supra note 23, at 63; Schiller, supra note 7, at 113. 
110 Masmoudi, supra note 5, at 175. 
III Gross, supra note 23, at 63; Higgins, supra note 98, at 27-29. 
112 Higgins, supra note 98, at 27-29. 
Il3 [d. at 28-29. 
II. /d. at 24. 
liS See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
116 Gross, supra note 23, at 63. 
117 See supra note III & accompanying text. 
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As such, the Civil and Political Covenant constitutes neither an invincible bul-
wark for an unfettered flow of information, nor a blanket endorsement of the 
government's right to balance that flow. Exactly what this document will mean 
in practice will depend upon the number of states adopting the Civil and Political 
Covenant and the Optional Protocol,IlB and the use of the Human Rights 
Committee by states and individuals.1I9 In purely legal terms, however, the Civil 
and Political Covenant does create an international system of rights and duties 
between states and individuals that is implemented according to an international 
standard. For those countries that accede to the provisions of the Civil and 
Political Covenant and the Optional Protocol, the NWICO would define the 
acceptable application of state restrictions on the flow of information within 
these rights and duties. 
IV. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND CULTURAL PROTECTIONISM: Two POSSIBLE 
LEGAL BASES FOR THE NWICO 
A. Background 
Within the parameters established by the Civil and Political Covenant, there 
is some allowance for state restriction of the right to seek, receive, and impart 
information. 120 In general, if a state is not restricted by a principle of customary 
or conventional international law, it may take any domestic action it chooses, 
even if such action has international ramifications. I21 Absent such a restricting 
principle, the state may legally stop or limit the flow of information by any 
means, such as expelling reporters or refusing admission of foreign broad-
casts.I22 Under the Civil and Political Covenant, a state party is restricted from 
limiting the flow of information except for the justifications expressed in Articles 
19 and 20. 123 Proponents of the NWICO, however, assert that the balanced flow 
of information should be a positive legal right of states, thereby further justi-
fying state attempts to restrict information flow. I24 Thus far, the NWICO's 
balanced flow principle has not been incorporated into any legally binding 
international instruments. I25 In the debate ove~ the NWICO, proponents of a 
principle of balanced flow have suggested two possible legal theories upon which 
liB Gross, supra note 23, at 63; see supra notes 100-01. 
119 Mose & Opsahl, supra note 70, at 329-31; Higgins, supra note 98, at 28-29. 
120 See supra note III and accompanying text. 
121 Gross, supra note 23, at 58, 64. 
122 !d. at 58. 
123 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
124 Masmoudi, supra note 5, at 183; Note, supra note 15, at 263. 
125 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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such a principle could be based: national sovereignty and cultural protection-
ism. 126 
The assertion of the theories of national sovereignty and cultural protection-
ism as bases for limiting the flow of information has been prominent in the 
discussions within UNESCO and the United Nations Committee on Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (Outer Space Committee) regarding direct broadcast sat-
ellites (DBS).127 DBS will permit direct audio-visual media flow from one nation 
to citizens of another. 128 This aspect of DBS has raised the question of whether 
broadcasting states should be required to obtain prior consent from the receiv-
ing state before direct broadcasting. 129 It is somewhat ironic that DBS has been 
the focus of this concern over government control of the flow of information, 
since various factors may make DBS less of a threat to governments and cultures 
than other currently existing means of international communication. 130 Because 
other media have at least as much effect upon receiving countries as DBS, it 
seems logical that any justification for government restrictions on the flow of 
information via DBS could be applied to other media as well.l31 
B. National Sovereignty 
In the debate over DBS III the U.N. General Assembly and the Outer Space 
Committee, the Soviet Union has been the major champion of the theory of 
national sovereignty as a legal justification for restricting the free flow of infor-
126 Freeman, Direct Broadcast Developments and Directions: The National Sovereignty and Cultural Integrity 
Positions, 74 PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 302, 302 (1980); Note, supra note 15, at 263. 
The following discussion of the differences betweei1 national sovereignty and cultural protectionism 
as legal theories will entail a certain amount of abstraction and generalization regarding the actions 
of states in restricting information flow. This is necessary in order to illuminate the divergent legal 
notions which underlie these two concepts. The author is aware, however, that in the real world of 
international politics the actions of states rarely fit into such neat analytical frameworks and are often 
the products of a variety of motivations. 
127 Freeman, supra note 126, at 302. DBS is a technology, albeit not fully developed, by which a 
satellite in geostationary orbit may broadcast television programs from a sending nation to receivers 
in other countries. These receivers are expected to be much less expensive and less centralized than 
those of current satellite communications systems. The increased power of DBS transmission will 
eventually make it possible to broadcast directly to community receivers, or even to individual home 
receivers. Laskin & Chayes, A Brief History of the Issues, in CONTROL OF THE DIRECT BROADCAST 
SATELLITE: V ALVES IN CONFLICT 3, 4 (Aspen Institute Program on Communications and Society 1974). 
128 Freeman, supra note 126, at 302. 
I29Id. 
130 de Sola Pool, supra note 32, at 27-29. Both prohibitive costs and the necessity of allocating an 
appropriate waveband make DBS transmission without the consent of the receiving nation unlikely. 
Id. at 27-28. DBS is best transmitted on a small part of the spectrum which currently is one of the 
most congested areas of wavebands. /d. at 27 n.l. If the receiving nation does not reserve a waveband 
for DBS transmission, the result will be mutual interference. Id. 
131 Id. at 29-32. Argument by analogy may not be possible if DBS conventions explicitly limit the 
application of their principles to DBS alone. See Bond (remarks), 74 PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 311, 
312 (1980). 
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mation.!32 The 1972 Draft Convention on Principles Governing the Use by 
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting,133 sub-
mitted to the General Assembly by the Soviet Union, requires the prior consent 
of states receiving DBSI34 based upon the theory of national sovereignty. 135 The 
extremism of the national sovereignty view of this document is evidenced by 
the fact that it does not even mention free flow of information. 136 
The theory of national sovereignty is also the main force behind the Soviet 
support for the NWICO.I37 The Soviet Union views the freedom to send infor-
mation as violative of the freedom of receiving countries to be protected from 
unwanted and detrimental information and communication. 138 Soviet writers 
have stressed that the legal basis of international exchange of information 
should be national sovereignty.139 
Supporting the primacy of national sovereignty over international principles 
of human rights are three tenets of traditional international human rights law. 
These are first, the status of the individual in international law, second, state 
implementation of human rights agreements, and third, noninterference. 140 
Western writers claim, however, that the importance of these aspects of tradi-
tional international law has been lessened in light of recent developments in the 
field of human rights. 141 
First, under traditional international law, only states are considered subjects 
of international legal rights and duties. 142 Under this view, human rights agree-
ments can only obligate states to secure rights to individuals. 143 State sovereignty 
132 Freeman, supra note 126, at 303-06. 
133 U.N. Doc. A/8771 at 4 (1972). [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention] 
134 Draft Convention, supra note 133, art. 5. 
135 U.N. Doc. A/8771 at 2 (letter from A. Gromyko). 
136 Freeman, supra note 126, at 304. 
137 See Androunas & Zassoursky, Protecting the Sovereignty of Information, 29]. COM. 186 (1979). The 
Soviet Union's insistence on the primacy of national sovereignty over the right of the individual to a 
free flow of information is indicative of its legal approach to the whole area of international human 
rights. Consistent with Marxist-Leninist political theory, the Soviet Union does not view human rights 
as inhering in the individual. The government in socialist society represents the collective will of the 
people. The only legally cognizable human rights, therefore, are those which the people grant to 
themselves through their government. These rights, which benefit the collective, are jeopardized by 
the assertion of individual rights against the sovereignty of the state. Thus, human rights in the Soviet 
system are not claims belonging to individuals that may be asserted against the government, as in 
western political and legal theory. Dean, Beyond Helsinki: The Soviet View of Human Rights in International 
Law, 21 VA.]' INT'L L. 55, 57-66 (1980). 
138 Androunas & Zassoursky, supra note 137, at 186. 
139 Androunas & Zassoursky, supra note 137, at 187. 
140 Dean, supra note 137, at 72-77. 
141 Higgins, supra note 98, at 15-17; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 60, at 61-67. 
142 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
143 Dean, supra note 137, at 73. 
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thus establishes a barrier between the individual and international law by making 
municipal law the only law for individuals. 144 
Western writers assert that this traditional concept of the individual has 
changed. 145 The nature of international law does not mandate the exclusion of 
the individual as a subject of international law; 146 in fact, the practice of states 
contradicts the traditional view. 147 To proclaim that the individual is not a subject 
of international law is to deny the existence of international human rights. 148 
The Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant is evidence of a trend 
toward recognition of individuals in international law. 149 The Soviet Union, 
while a party to the Civil and Political Covenant, has not acceded to the Optional 
Protocol. 150 Because of this, a person whose right to information is being re-
stricted by the Soviet Union cannot bring a complaint before the Human Rights 
Committee in order to resolve the matter. 
Second, the provisions of international agreements traditionally depend upon 
implementation solely by the state. 151 The preamble of the Civil and Political 
Covenant acknowledges this by emphasizing the role of states in promoting 
human rights. 152 The Human Rights Committee, however, operates as an ad-
ditional implementation body, which can test state interpretations of the docu-
ment's provisions. 153 According to the Soviet view, these international interpre-
tations conflict with national sovereignty.154 The Soviet Union, in observing the 
Civil and Political Covenant, makes frequent use of the national security restric-
tion on human rights. 155 Since the Soviet Union does not recognize the com-
petence of the Human Rights Committee to resolve complaints arising under 
the Civil and Political Covenant, the Soviet Union may decide for itself what 
are permissible restrictions on the right to information. 
The third traditional element of international law that supports the national 
sovereignty theory is that of noninterference. This element is expressed in 
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which states that "[nlothing contained in the 
144 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 60, at 67-68. 
145 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
146 Higgins, supra note 98, at 13-15; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 60, at 61. 
147 Pirates, for example, are often prosecuted by nations based upon violations of international law. 
H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 60, at 9. This constitutes a recognition of the pirate as a subject of 
international law. [d. 
148 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 60, at 71. 
149 Higgins, supra note 98, at 24-25. 
150 See supra notes 100-0 I and accompanying text. 
151 Dean, supra note 137, at 74. 
152 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 59, preamble. 
153 See Higgins, supra note 98, at 24; Mose & Opsahl, supra note 70, at 324. 
154 Dean, supra note 137, at 77. 
155 Higgins, supra note 98, at 27. 
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present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essent;ally within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."156 The Soviet Union, 
consistent with pre-1945 legal thought, considers human rights to be a matter 
of domestic jurisdiction. 157 Therefore, according to this position, protection of 
individual rights by an international body constitutes interference in violation 
of the U.N. Charter. 15s 
By contrast, one western writer asserts that international monitoring of the 
observance of human rights agreements does not constitute intervention under 
Article 2.159 Furthermore, he asserts that human rights are outside the realm 
of matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."160 Following 
this more narrow interpretation of Article 2, there exists an international obli-
gation of states to guarantee minimum human rights to their citizens. 161 
In sum, the theory of national sovereignty is diametrically opposed to legal 
principles of international human rights. Under the national sovereignty theory, 
human rights on the international level can only be vague generalities, not 
legally binding norms. 162 Human rights as concrete legal principles can be 
defined and implemented only by the state. 163 Thus, a future communications 
order based upon the theory of national sovereignty would place the individual's 
right to seek, receive, and impart information completely within the control of 
individual nations. 164 As such, a communications order based upon this theory 
would not be acceptable to those who seek to establish a means of protecting 
the individual's human right to information through the international com-
munity. 
C. Cultural Protectionism 
Like the theory of national sovereignty, cultural protectionism has arisen in 
the debate over control of the information flow of DBS.165 In 1972, Canada 
156 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. 
157 Dean, supra note 137, at 77-78. 
158 The Soviet Union, in justification of its interpretation of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, asserts 
that nonintervention in human rights matters contributes to world peace by allowing countries to 
maintain friendly relations. [d. at 78; see also Androunas & Zassoursky, supra note 137, at 189. 
159 H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 60, at 166-73. Intervention, as construed by an overwhelming 
majority of legal scholars, means an imposition of the will of the international body upon another 
state, through some type of enforcement. [d. at 167-68. As such, actions to encourage and promote 
compliance with human rights agreements would not constitute interference. [d. at 169. 
160 [d. at 176. A matter ceases to be domestic when it becomes the subject of an international 
obligations, such as a treaty or covenant. !d. 
161 Dean, supra note 137, at 77. 
162 [d. at 81. 
163 !d. at 81-82. 
164 See Freeman, supra note 126, at 306-07 (di.cussing DBS). 
165 [d. at 307. 
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and Sweden sponsored a set of draft principles governing DBS that was based 
upon, inter alia, the theory of cultural protectionism.[66 As with the Soviet 
proposal, the Canada/Sweden draft principles called for prior consent of the 
receiving country before DBS transmission could take place.[67 Since prior 
consent provisions threaten the free flow of information, the United States has 
opposed the Canada/Sweden draft.[68 Some developed countries in the West, 
however, as well as Third World nations, have supported the cultural protec-
tionism theory as a basis for DBS regulations, primarily out of fears that foreign 
countries with a great amount of media power might excessively intrude upon 
their respective cultures. [69 
Whereas the notion of national sovereignty is rooted in traditional theories 
of international law, the cultural protectionism theory has emerged with the 
development of the international community since 1945.[70 Recent human rights 
agreements have incorporated elements of cultural protectionism. The U.N. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights[7[ grants to 
states the duty of conserving, developing, and diffusing culture.172 Although 
this covenant establishes a right of the individual to take part in culturallife[73 
and recognizes the benefits of international cultural exchange,[74 the state is 
allowed to take steps to protect the national culture. [75 These steps might include 
restricting the free flow of information. [76 
In addition, there is an element of cultural protectionism contained within 
the Civil and Political Covenant. 177 This instrument permits government restric-
tions upon the free flow of information in order to comply with national cultural 
166 Draft Principles Governing Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 1051 
WG,3/L.4 (1973), reprinted in U.N. Doc. AlAC.J051107, Annex IV (1974). 
167 !d., art. 5. 
168 Discussion, 74 PROC. AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 317, 319-20 (1980). 
169 See id. at 317-21. Canada, for example, has difficulty maintaining a viable national broadcasting 
system because Canadians have access to a large number of U.S. television programs. Warren, A 
Canadian Perspective on Direct Broadcast Satellites and the New World Information and Communication Order, 
8 SYR. J. INT'L. L. & COM. 391 (1981). Third World nations are concerned about the extent to which 
western media will shape their social and cultural values. Aggarwala, supra note II, at xviii. 
170 Hargrove, International Law and the Case for Cultural Protectionism, in CONTROL OF THE DIRECT 
BROADCAST SATELLITE: V ALVES IN CONFLICT 85, 87-88 (Aspen Institute Program on Communications 
and Society 1974). 
171 G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 49 (1966) [hereinafter 
cited as Economic and Social Covenant]; see supra note 59. 
172 Economic and Social Covenant, supra note 171, art. 15, para. 2. 
m [d. art. IS, para. I. 
174 !d. art. IS, para. 4. 
175 !d. art. IS, para. 2. 
176 de Sola Pool, supra note 32, at 29-32 (since information threatens culture, measures restricting 
information flow may be justified under the Economic and Social Covenant). 
177 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 59. 
126 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No.1 
policies by the inclusion of an ordre public exception to Article 19. 178 Protectionist 
steps taken to promote such cultural policies could include the prohibition or 
restriction of advertisements in media and the enactment of programming 
standards. 179 Under the Optional Protocol, however, a state's reliance on the 
ordre public clause of the Civil and Political Covenant might be disapproved by 
the Human Rights Committee. 18o 
In an attempt to define an international standard whereby governments can 
legitimately employ restraints upon the free flow of information in the name 
of cultural protectionism, one writer has proposed four categories of justifiably 
protected interests. 181 They are 1) preservation of the international community 
heritage,I82 2) protection of national freedom of choice, or the possibility of 
diversity in deveiopment,I83 3) protection of local economic enterprise,I84 and 
4) protection of internal social and political order.185 This proposal reflects a 
desire to separate cultural protectionism from national sovereignty by showing 
where the international community, as opposed to an individual state, has an 
interest in protecting culture by balancing the flow of information. 186 Since a 
government's exercise of protectionist restrictions in the name of one or more 
of these community interests may impair other community interests, the success 
of the cultural protectionist doctrine in practice would depend heavily upon 
the ability of the international community to regulate state practice to avoid 
such a conflict. 187 International community interests would have to be not only 
clearly articulated, but also enforceable in a manner such that the doctrine of 
cultural protectionism serves more than mere national interests. 188 
17S [d. art. 19, para. 3(b). This section of the Civil and Political Covenant recognizes restrictions by 
the state "[flor the protection of ... public order (ordre public)." [d. The French term ordre public is more 
accurately defined as the public policy of the state, including political, economic, cultural, educational, 
and social policies. Buergenthal, supra note 55, at 78. 
179 [d. at 78-79. 
ISO See Higgins, supra note 98, at 28-29. 
lSI Hargrove, supra note 170, at 88-89. 
IS2 This concerns the protection of certain cultural phenomena which could be characterized, because 
of intrinsic artistic or scientific interest, as part of the global heritage of mankind, such as a small, 
geographically distinct population living within the predominant national culture. [d. at 90. 
IS3 This refers to the desires of countries to maintain a free choice in the course of their national 
development by avoiding a massive infusion of foreign culture. [d. at 91. This would be justified only 
as a means of bringing various influences into balance, not in limiting certain kinds of influences. [d. 
IS4 This concerns efforts to make local commercial sources of culture, such as publishers and 
broadcasters, competitive with similar foreign enterprises. [d. at 92. 
IS5 This interest includes the protection of a state's political institutions, as well as its moral and 
ideological systems. [d. at 94. Here, there is a compromise between freedom of choice (as described 
in the second category) and the traditional police powers of the state. !d. 
IS6!d. at 89. See also Nanda (remarks), 74 PRoc. AM. SOC'y INT'L L. 318-19 (1980). 
IS7 Hargrove, supra note 170, at 95-96. 
IssJd. 
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In conjunction with an international community with the ability to enforce 
well articulated international cultural protectionist norms, a future communi-
cations order based upon cultural protectionism need not sacrifice human rights 
to national sovereignty. A state choosing to restrict the individual's right to 
information, however, would have to justify its actions before an international 
body according to international standards. '89 The purpose of a cultural protec-
tionist communications order, therefore, would be to define clearly which re-
strictions are justified by international interests. 
v. ANALYSIS 
Based upon the above examination of the international legal basis for the 
individual's right to freedom of information and of the possible theories under 
which this right could be restricted as part of a future communications order, 
one may draw two conclusions. First, the individual does have an international 
legal right to freedom of information that the international community may 
protect, to some extent, from government intrusion. 190 Under the Civil and 
Political Covenant, however, this international right is not absolute, and may 
legally be limited by the state under certain circumstances. 191 Second, the the-
ories of national sovereignty and cultural protectionism present fundamentally 
different justifications for government control over the flow of information. 192 
According to the theory of national sovereignty, the international community 
is powerless to grant human rights to the individual and thereby to hold the 
state accountable for the protection of these rights. '93 The theory of cultural 
protectionism, however, holds that the international community may grant hu-
man rights to individuals and may also define the acceptable limits of state 
restrictions of those rights. '94 
Given these assumptions as to the international legal right to freedom of 
information and the underlying basis of the cultural protectionist theory, the 
United States should seek to strengthen the scheme of international rights 
protecting the freedom of information. The primary step in promoting the 
individual's right to information would be to encourage all nations to protect 
human rights in general. The United States could do this by ratifying the Civil 
and Political Covenant and the Optional Protocol and making the requisite 
declaration under Article 41. This would give the United States increased ability 
to enforce human rights in the international community. It would also give the 
189Id. 
190 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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United States additional influence in encouraging other nations, particularly 
those of the Third World, to follow its example. Only through the establishment 
of an international community committed to the protection of individuals' hu-
man rights will freedom of information become a reality throughout the world. 
The United States could also play an important role in formulating the 
NWICO. The imbalance in the international flow of information is a reality, 
and does present a legitimate problem for the international community, and 
for developing countries in particular. Excessive government controls on the 
individual's right to information, however, poses a threat even greater than that 
posed by the imbalance to both the West and Third World nations. Freedom 
of thought and conscience is the basis for all human rights; without freedom 
of information, these basic human rights do not truly exist. 195 The problem 
presented by the NWICO, therefore, is how to steer a safe path between the 
Scylla of unfettered flow of information and the Charybdis of state oppression. 
A future communications order which extols the virtues of national sover-
eignty does not provide an acceptable solution. To endorse the national sover-
eignty theory is to deny the very existence of international human rights. The 
Soviet Union, for example, which has clearly demonstrated its strong opposition 
to freedom of information,196 professes adherence to the Civil and Political 
Covenant, but reserves the right to be the sole interpreter and implementor of 
its provisions. 197 It has steadfastly refused to sacrifice any portion of its sover-
eignty to the international community that seeks to protect individuals from the 
Soviet government. An international communications order based upon the 
theory of national sovereignty would serve as an additional justification from 
the international community to the Soviet Union and other states opposed to 
the international protection of the right to information, to continue their re-
strictive practices. 
The theory of cultural protectionism, however, presents a different case. A 
new information and communication order based upon this theory, as defined 
by one scholar,198 would clearly define which state restrictions upon the flow of 
information will be permitted by the international community as a whole. These 
acceptable restrictions, the substantive interpretation of the ordre public clause 
of the Civil and Political Covenant, would be the product of international 
legislation, and therefore subject to international judicial interpretation, possibly 
via the Human Rights Committee. The NWICO, if based upon cultural protec-
tionism, would be a statement permitting nations to restrict the flow of infor-
mation. Nonetheless, states currently have this ability under the Civil and Po-
195 Chen, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CaMP. L. 37, 37-39 (1982). 
196 Power & Abel, supra note 2, at 119. 
197 Higgins, supra note 98, at 27. 
198 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
1986] NWICO AND HUMAN RIGHTS 129 
litical Covenant, and do in fact restrict the flow of information in practice. 199 A 
cultural protectionist communications order would not, at least, sacrifice the 
individual's rights in this area to narrow national interests. National reasons for 
restrictions would have to be justified before an international standard.20o The 
United States could play an important role in the creation of the NWICO by 
being an ardent and articulate proponent of the individual's rights within the 
scheme of clearly defined international standards. 
If the NWICO is to be based upon cultural protectionism, an important caveat 
must be made. The success of the NWICO in reducing the harms of an unfet-
tered flow of information while still protecting individual rights, depends upon 
the ability of the international community to define and enforce agreed upon 
principles. Currently, the international mechanisms for the protection of human 
rights are rather weak. The international community has not been very effective 
in protecting individuals. Although, in purely legal terms, a future communi-
cations order based upon cultural protectionism does not conflict with the 
internationalization of human rights law, it may, in practice, fail to keep the 
powers of the state in check. For the NWICO to be implemented without 
jeopardizing basic human rights, the international community must strengthen 
its ability to regulate the practice of states. 
Despite the real possibility of establishing a new international information 
and communication order which does not essentially oppose the concept of an 
international right to freedom of information, the United States has chosen, by 
leaving UNESCO, not to debate the issue. Statements by U.S. officials indicated 
that the United States would continue to oppose any internationally allowed 
state restrictions on the flow of information.201 In contrast to this absolutist 
stance against international regulation of the flow of information, the United 
States has historically been willing to accept domestic restrictions on freedom 
of information. In the United States, for example, first amendment constitu-
tional guarantees are limited by various governmental actions, such as Federal 
Communications Commission regulations. 202 Further, in a U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that: 
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical ex-
treme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles 
of policy which are other than those on which the particular right 
is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own 
when a certain point is reached.203 
199 Note, supra note 15, at 253-54. 
200 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
201 Discussion, 74 PROC. AM. SOC'y 1NT'L L. 317-20 (1980). 
202 Laskin, supra note 74, at 59-60; see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982). 
203 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1907). 
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Like all human rights, the individual's right to seek, receIve and impart 
information will also be limited by other "principles of policy." The call by the 
Third World for the NWICO has brought that day nearer. If, given the need 
to correct current imbalances in the flow of information, the creation of the 
NWICO is inevitable, the United States should not remove itself from the debate 
over the character of this new order. By withdrawing from the debate, the 
United States will give up the qpportunity to develop a more equitable infor-
mation order providing strong protection for human rights. The unfortunate 
result of this U.S. withdrawal may be the creation of a future communications 
order based upon national sovereignty and supporting unqualified government 
restrictions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the debate over the NWICO, the concept of a balanced flow of information 
is competing with the right to a free flow of information for primacy in the 
international legal system. Some nations, such as the Soviet Union, are using 
the NWICO discussions to promote the theory of national sovereignty and to 
justify state control over the flow of information. Other countries in the Third 
World and the West, however, have advocated the development of international 
standards, based upon cultural protectionism, whereby state control of the flow 
of information can be tested by the international community. Considering that 
the Third World's political power within UNESCO also exists in the U.N. 
General Assembly,204 the United States should reconsider its decision to leave 
UNESCO. The NWICO issue does not show signs of going away, and the United 
States may have to face this issue in the General Assembly in the near future. 205 
Assuming that the United States does not withdraw from the United Nations 
altogether, U.S. policy makers should work as best they can within UNESCO in 
advocating for the protection of vital human rights within a more just and 
equitable information order. 
Stephen Raube-Wilson 
204 Note, The Human Right o[Communication, 4 N.V. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 83, 99. 
205Id. at 99-\00. 
